Abstract-In this paper, a method is presented to extend the length of integral distinguisher of Feistel-SP structure, based on which a new 8-round distinguisher for the block cipher Camellia is proposed. Moreover, integral attacks on round-reduced Camellia without FL/FL -1 are improved. We attack 11-round Camellia-128 with the data complexity of 2 120 and the time complexity of 2 125.5 , and attack 12-round Camellia-256 with the data complexity of 2 120 and the time complexity of 2 214.3 . These attacks are the best integral attacks on round-reduced Camellia so far.
INTRODUCTION
The block cipher Camellia was proposed by NTT and Mitsubishi in 2000 [1] . It is based on Feistel structure with SP-type F function and FL/FL -1 functions layers, and it supports the block length of 128 bits and a variable key length of 128/192/256 bits. Camellia was accepted by ISO/IEC as an international standard [6] . It is also a winner of NESSIE, CRYPTREC project and IETF. The security of Camellia was initially analyzed by the algorithm designers. Efficient attacks on Camellia include linear cryptanalysis [14] , differential cryptanalysis [13, 14] , impossible differential cryptanalysis [15, 17] , truncated differential cryptanalysis [7, 9, 15] , higher order differential cryptanalysis [5] , collision attack [16] and Square attack [3, 19, 20] . The best attacks on Camellia without FL/FL -1 function layer were impossible differential cryptanalysis [18] , which can attack 12-round Camellia-128 and 16-round Camellia-256 without FL/FL -1 . Integral attack was extended from Square attack, which is one of the best attacks on AES [2] . Ferguson et al. in [4] improved this attack to 8 rounds version of Rijndael-128 with the partial sum technique and the herd technique. Knudsen and Wagner first proposed the definition of integral and analyzed it as a dual to differential attacks particularly applicable to block ciphers with bijective components [8] . Several years later, Reza Z'aba et al. presented bit pattern based integral attack [12] . The integral attack applied to many kinds of block ciphers so far, such as Rijndael [11] , ARIA [10] , and Serpent [12] . Higher order differential attack and Square attack are different from integral attack. However, the length of their distinguisher can be extended by using the integral property. In this paper a method is presented to extend the length of Camellia's distinguisher, based on which the effect of integral attack will be improved. Moreover, this method can also be used even on any Feistel-SP structure. This paper is organized as follows: Section II provides a brief description of preliminaries. Section III describes a method to extend the length of the distinguisher. Section IV describes the attacks on 11/12-round Camellia. Finally, Section V concludes this paper. F .
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Description of Camellia
The round function of Camellia includes three basic operations: Round Key Addition, Substitution Layer and Diffusion Layer (Fig.2) 
B. Notations
In the following, we introduce some notations used in this paper. The plaintext are denoted as 10 ( , ) XX , where
( , , , ),
Other notations that will be used in this paper are described as follows: 
C. Higher Order Integral Attack and the Partial Sum Technique
Higher Order Integral Attack. The integral attack has many interesting features. It can saturate S-Box Layer and Round Key Addition Layer will not affect this property of saturation. However, the linear transformation influences the length of the integral distinguisher. Integral attack considers a particular collection of m bytes in the plaintexts and ciphertexts. In [8] , Knudsen and Wagner also generalized this approach to higher order integrals: the original set to consider becomes a set of d m vectors which differ in d components where the sum of this set is predictable after a certain number of rounds. The sum of this set is called a th d -order integral. In this paper we not only pay attention to the sum, but also to the appearing times of the sum value.
The Partial Sum Technique. In our attack we will use the partial sum technique. For a value 0 1 2 , , , ,
Guessing the values of 0 k and 1 k ,we will complete the transformation
Guessing the values of i k , we will complete the transformation 11 ( , , , , )
In order to obtain the value of 
III. INTEGRAL DISTINGUISHERS BASED ON FEISTEL-SP STRUCTURE
In this section we first explain how to construct a 2nd-order 5-round integral distinguishers (Sec. 2.1), then introduce a method to extend the length of integral distinguishers and the proof is also given in detail (Sec.
2.2).
A. The 2nd-Order 5-Round Integral Distinguisher
The idea of constructing a 2nd-order 5-round integral distinguisher is like that of constructing 5-round higher order differential distinguishers in [5] . Lemma 1 [5] . Let the bytes of 0,1 0,2 , xx are active, and other bytes of 01 , XX are constants, each value of t appears even times.
B. A Method to Extend the Length of Integral Distinguisher
In the structure of Feistel-SP, the Xor operation and the permutation P are linear transformations (Fig.3) , which can influence the general integral property and also can be used to extend the integral distinguisher. Let some bytes of 0 X be active, and the bytes of 1 X be constant, and then the input of a known t -round integral distinguisher is 10 ( , ) XX . Now we extend it backward 157 by one round using the following formula: Extending three more rounds forward and we will obtain the following: () 
() PX
Simplifying the above equations, we will obtain the equivalent equations as follows. ()
According to the simplified equations above, we find that there is only one solution . For   32   2 values  of 3 4 1 2 , , , y y y y , we get a set of 32 2 solutions, and each value of 5 6 7 8 9 , , , , x x x x x is determined by 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 , , , , , , , , x x x x x x x x x leads to 40 2 sets after one round encryption, in each set the bytes of 1 2 3 4 , , , y y y y are active.
3 x x x x , the number of which appear odd times, we do the following steps: (a) Guess the two bytes of 10, 2 k and 10,3 k , and we obtain the corresponding 5-byte value 1 10,5 10,7 10,8 11,6 ( , , , , ) Step 2-(b) costs 16 8 22 
64
22  computations at most. This is same as the other phases of
Step 2, so the work factor of Step 2 is 64 25  S-box lookups. There are also additional cost to compute 1 10 6 [ ( )] PX  in each phase of Step 2. However, using rough equivalence of 8 S-box applications to one-round encryption with a new key, the complexity to compute 1 10 6 [ ( )] PX  can be ignored. For a wrong key, the probability that each value of t appears even times is less than 169 2  . After analyzing a structure of plaintexts, we expect 
B. Integral Attacks on Camellia-192/256
In this subsection, we describe improved integral attacks on 11-round Camellia-192 and 12-round Camellia-256. The key schedule can't be used here. We add 1 round after 10-round Camellia, and guess all bytes of K 11 , and decrypt the last round, where the work factor
